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ANTITRUST, THE GIG ECONOMY, AND 




INTRODUCTION: DECLINING LABOR POWER IS (PARTLY) AN ANTITRUST 
STORY 
Worker bargaining power has diminished over the last forty years. Between 
1948 and 1979, median wages closely tracked output per worker.1 Since then, 
productivity has continued to increase (until leveling off in the decade of the 
2000s), while median pay has stagnated, creating an ever-widening gap between 
median wages and productivity. The widening gap contrasts with the central 
prediction of neoclassical economic theory about the labor market: that workers 
are paid what they are worth.2 At the same time, inequality within the distribution 
of labor income is higher, and has risen faster, than can possibly be explained by 
any notion of a skills gap between workers and the needs of today’s employers.3 
And since the 2000s, these dual trends demarcating the declining bargaining 
power of workers in the economy have been joined by a third: the reduction in 
labor’s share of national income, which economists had assumed was stable over 
the long run. In fact, it has ratcheted downward over the last two business cycles.4 
The aim of this paper is to augment the interpretation of these trends with an 
element that has received very little attention from labor-oriented scholars: the 
decline and erosion of antitrust law and its enforcement. Whereas there was once 
a sharp line where labor law ended and antitrust began, there is now a gray area, 
within which a more powerful firm can tell a less-powerful contractor or worker 
what to do without being liable under antitrust or labor law. The erosion of the 
statutory employment relationship, and thus the ability of employers to evade the 
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obligations that go along with it, has received wide attention from labor scholars 
and in public debate. What has been ignored is that the deterioration of antitrust 
is what legally allows more powerful firms to tell subordinate firms, contractors, 
and workers what to do even if those subordinates are not, legally, their 
employees. Antitrust has also prevented those same subordinates from 
coordinating among themselves to strengthen their own hand in negotiations. 
This paper considers two different ways that antitrust has contributed to the 
increasing imbalance of power between employers and workers. First, antitrust 
has legalized vertical restraints, allowing the economy’s most powerful actors to 
closely direct and supervise the behavior of less-powerful actors. Second, 
antitrust has been used by those same powerful actors to prevent less-powerful 
actors from organizing and coordinating on their own behalf against such 
concentrations of power. Parts II and III of this article deal with each of these, 
and the Part IV proposes a policy agenda for putting the antitrust laws to work 
in the labor market according to their original purpose: namely, to de-
concentrate economic power. 
II 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 
David Weil’s book The Fissured Workplace describes a crucial component of 
the decline in labor’s bargaining power: the gradual disappearance of the 
traditional, and statutory, employment relationship.5 Instead of uniting workers 
at different levels of the labor market hierarchy (wages, skills, and social 
prestige), the contemporary corporation has become a mechanism for 
segregating low-wage (and even some middle-wage) workers from the economy’s 
dominant decision-makers: the executives and shareholders of the economy’s 
leading corporations and the financial institutions that own and control them. 
Although most workers remain statutory employees of some employer, they are 
increasingly remote from the decision-making entity that exerts power over their 
day-to-day lives and terms of work.6 
Weil is himself a former senior official responsible for enforcing federal labor 
law, and he rightly points to the ease with which employers can evade that law by 
re-classifying workers as either independent contractors or as employees of their 
contractors as a crucial element in legalizing this fissured business model.7 Many 
other scholars and organizations, including worker organizations, have 
emphasized changes in labor law that are very important to understanding how 
these trends erode worker bargaining power in the economy and ensure that it 
takes the form of inter-firm wage segregation.8 Specifically, the National Labor 
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Relations Act9 and the Fair Labor Standards Act,10 as well as numerous other 
state and federal labor regulations, impose tests for statutory employment as a 
necessary precondition for a worker to enjoy their protections. Increasingly, 
employers who classify their workers as exempt contractors rather than 
employees are able to pass these tests, thanks to deferential court rulings,11 
technologies that enable employers to manage workers from afar, and industry 
deregulation that legalizes new, vertically dis-integrated business models in a 
given sector, among many other causes. These all give employers both the legal 
means and the pecuniary motive to push their workers outside the legal 
boundaries of the firm under whose effective control they remain. 
Weil’s research is classified methodologically as industry case studies of what 
he calls the “lead firms” that direct and control a series of contractors and 
affiliates that actually employ the workers and do the work. His findings have 
been confirmed by more traditional economics studies of inter-firm earnings 
inequality using matched employer-employee data from a variety of sources.12 
For instance, Song and others used social security records to document the rise 
in inter-firm inequality; increasingly, the highest-paid workers work for the firms 
where average pay is the highest.13 This is not because those firms are inherently 
more productive than other firms due to their firm-specific characteristics, but 
rather that they have gotten better at sorting out well-paid and highly-educated 
workers and excluding low- and middle-wage workers from their employment.14 
A study by Abowd and others of data from state unemployment insurance 
records verifies these distinctions, and attaches further significance to working at 
a well-paid firm. Not only do workers earn more now, but they do so for the rest 
of their careers.15 “High-paying firms facilitate moving workers to the top of the 
earnings distribution and keeping them there.”16 Labor market surveys paint a 
similar picture.17 
In a competitive labor market, the identity of a worker’s firm is irrelevant to 
what he or she gets paid, because if any worker were paid less than they were 
worth they would quickly switch to a job offering them their competitive market 
wage. In a competitive labor market equilibrium, all firms pay the same to all 
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 9.   National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).  
 10.   Fair Labor Standards Act, 55 Stat. 756 (1941).  
 11.  Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106291.  
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Res., Working Paper No. 23224, 2017).  
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workers with similar characteristics. In reality, though, firms have considerable 
discretion to dictate pay, because outside job offers are sufficiently hard to obtain 
that it is unlikely that workers will have the option to leave.18 In other words, 
labor markets are not competitive, as evidenced by the  increasing earnings 
inequality between firms. The aforementioned research on inter-firm inequality 
shows that workers are increasingly remote from profits and from centers of 
economic power.19 Anyone familiar with the history of labor organizing, worker 
solidarity, and the conditions for social mobility can recognize that under those 
conditions, it’s impossible for workers to benefit from economic growth. An 
article from the New York Times in 2017 made this point by contrasting the 
experience of janitors working at the corporate headquarters of Kodak in the 
early 1980s versus Apple today. The Kodak janitor was employed by the 
company, enjoyed a tuition subsidy as part of her benefits package, learned how 
to use inventory software as part of obtaining a college degree on the job, and 
ultimately worked her way up within Kodak to be head of IT for the whole 
company. 20 Meanwhile, the Apple janitor is employed by a contracted, franchised 
janitorial services firm, enjoys no part of the benefits package of an Apple 
employee, and has no chance of obtaining a promotion up the hierarchy of what 
is now one of the economy’s most valuable single firms.21 
The antitrust side of the story of the separation of workers from lead firms is 
the simultaneous erosion in the jurisprudence of the Sherman Act’s prohibitions 
on vertical restraints. In the context of antitrust, a vertical restraint is a 
contractual provision or mode of operation that restricts the autonomy of the 
counterparty in the case where each party operates at a distinct segment of the 
supply chain. For example, if an automobile manufacturing company operates a 
network of independently owned dealerships, and its dealers are forbidden from 
selling within a given radius of another authorized dealer’s location, that is 
territorial exclusivity, a non-price vertical restraint. If such a contract imposes the 
final retail price of said automobiles, that is vertical price-fixing, or in antitrust 
lingo, resale price maintenance, which can be either a minimum or a maximum 
(or both, in the case of one definite price at which the car would be re-sold). 
Other vertical restraints include the varieties of exclusive practices that suppliers 
might impose on their affiliated dealers or distributors, like compulsory purchase 
contracts—known as full-line forcing or requirements contracts.22 
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 21.  Id. 
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Such exclusive dealing was the subject of the 1951 antitrust case United States 
v. Richfield Oil Co.23 The case concerned the relations between a dominant oil 
refiner and gasoline supplier—Richfield Oil—and its affiliated service stations, 
which were required to source their gasoline solely from Richfield and to carry 
exclusively retail auto parts, sponsored products, according to supply contracts 
negotiated by Richfield, rather than seeking out and negotiating their own 
sources of supply according to their customers’ preferences. The court ruled 
unequivocally for the government on the grounds that it exercised de facto 
control over these “independent business men,” in contravention of the antitrust 
laws, despite the fact that they were not employees of the company. That case 
created a sharp distinction and a comprehensive delineation between the realm 
of labor and antitrust: if subordinate entities are “independent business men” and 
not employees, it is illegal to exercise control. The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the same basic principle against coercion of non-employees by vertical 
supply contract in the 1964 case Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California.24 
It is precisely through the erosion of the Richfield Oil standard that the 
fissured workplace has been allowed to come about. Independent business 
people are independent for the purposes of evading labor law, but once pushed 
outside the border of the firm, the restrictions antitrust places on their 
domination have been all but erased. As such, what Weil calls lead firms can 
continue to exercise control and direct their business operations by contract.25 
Those contracts would once have been illegal, before antitrust jurisprudence 
began to search out spurious justifications for their immunity on the basis of 
supposed efficiency.26 For example, manufacturers would want their branded 
distributors to be bound by contractual provisions to ensure that dealers 
represent the brand effectively to customers, rather than hide their poor 
customer service behind the brand’s overall prestige, or that they must contribute 
to its marketing budget and abide by its standardized branding and pricing 
policies. Theoretically, this would serve the overall collective interest of the 
supplier-distributor network. The efficiencies to be gained by permitting 
franchisors to exercise overall direction and control were assumed to flow 
eventually to consumers in the form of increased output, enhanced variety or 
quality, or lower prices—all reflecting the fact that vertical control exercised this 
way is, in fact, pro- rather than anti-competitive and therefore ought not to be 
penalized by the antitrust laws.27 
 
 23.  See United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S. D. Cal., 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S. 922 
(1952). 
 24.  See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. 13 (1964). 
 25.  WEIL, supra note 5. 
 26.  See Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, J. L. ECON. 86 (1960); Thomas 
R. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence, Bureau of 
Economics Staff Report to the FTC (1983). 
 27.  See ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING, 291–
301 (2005) (containing an explicit argument for permitting franchisors to exercise vertical control in these 
ways). 
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Brian Callaci lays out how this process occurred in one sector, so-called 
business-format franchising.28 As he writes, “While the economic boundaries of 
the firm correspond to the extent of centrally planned and hierarchically 
coordinated production, the legal boundaries are set in politically contested 
legislatures and courts. Exploiting or creating mismatches between the two has 
enabled corporations to enjoy economic benefits of vertical integration while 
avoiding many of the legal risks and costs.”29 In the case of franchising, that took 
the exact form that courts had ruled illegal in Richfield Oil and Simpson v. Union 
Oil Co. of California: franchisors licensed their trademarks and business models 
to an army of franchisees, who would be granted exclusive territories in exchange 
for agreeing to exclusive supply contracts, all enforced by the threat of dealer 
terminations. 
Economists, particularly those operating in the Law and Economics tradition, 
have interpreted the rise of these hybrid structures, part firm, part market 
organizations, as reflecting the evolution of an efficient allocation of coordination 
rights and the alignment of incentives between principal and agent so as to 
remove the need for direct supervision and take advantage of economies of scale 
and specialization.30 But Callaci shows that, in fact, the advent and spread of 
franchising was not due to the law catching up with the natural evolution of a 
business model marked by superior efficiency.  Rather, it is due to a concerted 
lobbying campaign31 to pry apart the sharp border between labor and antitrust 
represented by Richfield Oil and grow a whole business model in the legal gray 
area.32 As far as antitrust was concerned, the operation was meant to roll back 
the per se illegality of non-price vertical restraints that existed in antitrust 
following the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 
in 1967, and the per se illegality for maximum resale price maintenance that 
existed following the Court’s ruling in Albrecht v. Herald Company in 1968.33 
With the Court’s decisions in Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania in 1977 and 
in State Oil Co. v. Khan in 1997, antitrust immunity for vertical integration by 
contract was complete.34 
It was not just antitrust where franchisors and their trade association were 
able to have their way. In 1966, the Small Business Administration re-classified 
franchisees as independent to avail themselves of subsidized federal loans, 
 
 28.  Brian Callaci, Control Without Responsibility: The Legal Creation of Franchising 1960-1980 
(December 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington Center for Equitable Growth). 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983); BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 27; Francine LaFontaine & 
Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in 
HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, 29 (Pablo Buccirossi ed., 2005). 
 31.  Callaci, supra note 28, at 4.  
 32.  LaFontaine & Slade, supra note 30.  
 33.  See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 
U.S. 365 (1967). 
 34.  See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
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despite concerns that this was essentially financing the marketing and distribution 
activities of some of the economy’s largest and most powerful corporations.35 The 
general counsel to the agency, Philip F. Zeidman, who had advocated internally 
for that policy change, subsequently served as counsel to the International 
Franchise Association for almost four decades.36 Just last year, the inspector 
general of the SBA concluded that its loans to poultry growers are likely illegal 
because those small businesses are in fact under such direct control from the 
major poultry integrators—Perdue, Tysons, and Koch Poultry—that the farmers 
cannot be considered small businesses.37 
In addition to their treatment of franchisees as independent in order to 
qualify them for subsidized loans, the franchisors were successful at limiting the 
definition of joint employer under the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act so that they could not legally be considered employers of 
their franchisees’ workers.38 That made any attempt by workers to bargain 
collectively against both franchisees and franchisors a secondary boycott, a 
practice expressly prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act.39 Altogether, these 
changes gave franchisors maximum control, but minimal responsibility, and led 
the business models of franchisees toward poor treatment of low-wage workers, 
since franchisees have few, if any other margins, in which to exercise their 
autonomy in order to increase profits. 
Recently, the issue of no-poaching restrictions in franchising contracts has 
drawn attention from researchers,40 elected officials,41 and antitrust enforcers.42 
In such contracts, franchisees commit not to hire workers employed by 
franchisees elsewhere in the franchising network of which they are a member. 
Correspondingly, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has made its 
view known to a federal court where private litigation against such a no-poach 
provision is underway. It argued that no-poaching provisions in franchise 
agreements are akin to other restrictive vertical contractual provisions in 
franchising contracts and hence subject to the rule of reason, the permissive 
standard put in place by Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania and State Oil Co. 
 
 35.  Callaci, supra note 28, at 13.  
 36.  Id. at 21. 
 37.  OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SMALL BUS. ASSOC., EVALUATION OF SBA 7(A) LOANS MADE 
TO POULTRY FARMERS (March 6, 2018). 
 38.  Econ. Policy Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regarding Standard for Determining 
Joint-Employer Status (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/joint-employer-comments-feb-
2019/ [https://perma.cc/84FQ-FGBV]. 
 39.  Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 §8(b)(4)(b) (1947).  
 40.  See, e.g., Brian Callaci, Vertical Power and the Creation of a Fissured Workplace: The Case of 
Franchising (November 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington Center for 
Equitable Growth); Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion 
in the Franchise Sector (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 24831, 2017). 
 41.  See, e.g., S. 2480, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 42.  See, e.g., Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Stigar v. Dough 
Dough, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244-SAB (E.D. Wash. March 8, 2019).  
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v. Khan.43 The DOJ specifically rejects the idea that franchising networks are 
hub-and-spoke arrangements,44 therefore that no-poach clauses might be 
horizontal agreements not to compete and thus illegal per se. This intervention 
by the DOJ leans  against the relatively pro-enforcement posture it expressed in 
2016 in its “Guidance for Human Resource Professionals.”45 The prior 
administration never stated whether no-poaching provisions in franchising 
contracts were to be treated as per se illegal or considered under the rule of 
reason. But alongside the unwillingness of the NLRB to extend dual-employer 
status to franchisors as well as franchisees (and notwithstanding a recent federal 
appellate ruling constraining its ability to do so),46 this use of no-poach clauses 
reflects powerful employers’ ability to direct and restrict the activities and 
employment of their workers, without being answerable in any way to those 
workers themselves. 
The contentions the DOJ makes in its statement of interest are in conflict with 
the economics of no-poaching agreements in labor markets where employer 
market power is pervasive.47 There is no functional difference between a series of 
uniform, bilateral, putatively vertical no-poaching agreements, collectively 
barring franchisees in a franchising network from hiring workers from elsewhere 
in the network, and a single multilateral, putatively horizontal no-poaching 
agreement between the individual franchisees. Those two things have the same 
anti-competitive effect on labor markets. Thus, antitrust law should not treat 
them differently based on the horizontal versus vertical formalism. The DOJ 
brief appeals to the potential for countervailing efficiencies that swayed the 
Supreme Court to abandon per se treatment of non-price vertical restraints in 
Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania. Notably, however, those ostensible 
benefits accrue to consumers, not to workers, if they accrue to anyone at all other 
than the company imposing the restraint. If antitrust law implicates competition 
in labor markets as well as competition in output markets, as the DOJ agrees is 
the case, then it should not justify anti-competitive restraints that harm workers 
by making the labor market less competitive by claiming they might benefit 
consumers.48 Moreover, the amicus curiae brief filed by the Attorney General of 
Washington State points out that franchising networks contain both franchisor-
owned and franchisee-owned establishments, rendering a no-poaching 
agreement binding on franchisees likely to restrain them from hiring retail 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.   See FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
PROFESSIONALS (2016). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See Rachel M. Cohen, Workers Just Notched a Rare Win in Federal Court, THE INTERCEPT 
(January 3, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/03/nlrb-joint-employer-ruling/ 
[https://perma.cc/33WE-TM36]. 
 47.  See generally José Azar et al., Measuring Labor Market Power Two Ways, AEA PAPERS & 
PROCEEDINGS (forthcoming May 2019); Arindrajit Dube et al., Monopsony in Online Labor Markets, 
AER: INSIGHTS (forthcoming June 2019); Douglas A. Webber, Firm Market Power and the Earnings 
Distribution, 35 LAB. ECON., 123-134 (2015). 
 48.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUST, supra note 44. 
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workers employed by franchisors.49 Altogether, the pending litigation over 
franchising no-poaching agreements highlights antitrust’s tolerance for restraints 
that bind both franchisees and their workers. This belies recent claims by several 
antitrust authorities that labor markets and product markets are treated 
symmetrically under current antitrust jurisprudence and enforcement.50 They are 
not. 
More recently than the expansion of franchising under permissive antitrust 
treatment is the advent of the so-called gig economy: the deployment of 
independent contractor status for workers, not just for the independent 
businesses who employ them. This makes each individual worker an independent 
business, and thus denuded of any protections under labor law. However, they 
can simultaneously be controlled entirely by employer/customers without the 
protections and stability of the employment relationship enshrined in statute 
during the New Deal. This is the business model that online labor platforms like 
Uber, Lyft, Handy, and Care.com have perfected: under the law, workers deal 
bilaterally with gigs whose employers have none of the standard obligations of 
employers, while the platform operates the entire labor market to its own 
benefit—what Sanjukta Paul has called a “for-profit hiring hall.”51 This is enabled 
by the GPS technology of monitoring workers, the ability of the platform to 
dictate the terms on which participants will transact, the use of customer ratings 
as a pretext for de-activation rather than direct supervision, and the immunity of 
all of this from any regulatory scrutiny or collective bargaining on the part of 
workers of any sort. 
In 2016, an Uber customer filed an antitrust suit against Uber52 and its CEO 
in New York claiming that it amounted to a price- and wage-fixing conspiracy 
among hundreds of thousands of independent businesses—its drivers, for whom 
Uber determines and dictates the terms on which its drivers are allocated 
customers and the prices that will be charged to them, including the share earned 
by the driver.53 The genesis of the suit was the repeated failed efforts to have 
drivers classified as employees under state and federal labor regulations. To 
defeat those suits, Uber  claimed to be a software company licensing its service 
 
 49.  Brief for the Attorney General of Washington as Amicus Curiae, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., 
No. 2:18-cv-00244-SAB (E.D. Wash. March 11, 2019). 
 50.  See C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers That Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 7, 2078 
(2018); Letter from Federal Trade Commission Acting Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen to Senator Cory 
Booker (December 1, 2017) (on file with author).  
 51.  Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 
38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 2, 233, 233 (2017).  
 52.  The suit was initially filed against just the CEO, Travis Kalanick, as a means to avoid the 
mandatory arbitration clause that eventually kicked the case out of court, but Uber was later joined as a 
defendant.  
 53.  Marshall Steinbaum, Uber’s Antitrust Problem, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 11, 2016), 
https://prospect.org/article/uber%E2%80%99s-antitrust-problem [https://perma.cc/8SPD-YBJD]; 
Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust Implications of Labor Platforms, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (May 
2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/CPI-Steinbaum.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y2EY-49CS].  
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to independent drivers for the ease of contacting potential customers. As such, 
they did not employ the drivers, nor did Uber directly provide transportation to 
customers. 
If drivers are not employees, so the theory behind the antitrust suit went, then 
they must be independent businesses, and hence Uber setting the terms on which 
they transact with customers, including fixing the prices charged to customers, 
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act’s ban on restraints of trade. In this 
respect, the plaintiff was helped by the precedent set by the Apple E-books 
antitrust case, which proceeded against Apple and five book publishers for 
conspiring to set up an alternative E-books platform to Amazon’s.54 That case 
was ruled to be a hub-and-spoke conspiracy and thus per se illegal.55 If Apple and 
five book publishers is hub-and-spoke, why not Uber and a hundred thousand 
drivers?56 
In the end, Meyer v. Kalanick, was sent to arbitration rather than litigation 
thanks to the mandatory arbitration clause included in Uber’s terms of service. 
Therefore, the issue of whether Uber is a price-fixing conspiracy, and whether 
that price-fixing is horizontal, was never resolved at trial. But Uber did 
commission at least two economics papers that signal what its antitrust defense 
would have been: Uber’s control over its drivers, including price-fixing, benefits 
customers because it increases the consumer surplus in the ridesharing market.57 
This illustrates the core reason why all of these business models that 
subordinate the interests of workers, franchisees, and suppliers generally to those 
of dominant buyers obtain immunity from antitrust law as it is currently 
interpreted: the consumer welfare standard, which holds that the sole metric for 
assessing harm to competition within the meaning of the antitrust laws is the 
effect on consumers, and in practice, the effect on prices charged to consumers.58 
If the restrictions operated by Uber, by franchisors, by poultry integrators, and 
by powerful businesses generally can be shown to benefit consumers, or at least 
not to harm them, then they are ipso facto immune from antitrust liability. 
This constriction of what the antitrust laws prohibit is a far cry from Richfield 
Oil, which contains an overt analysis of power dynamics in the supplier-
distributor relationship as the reason why antitrust must lean against such a 
 
 54.  United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (2013). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  On the other hand, in the Apple E-books case, the publishers organized among themselves as 
part of negotiating the entry of Apple’s rival e-books platform. Arguably this is not the case with Uber 
or other ridesharing platforms, or labor platforms generally, in which there is no meaningful agreement 
among the many gig workers. 
 57.  See, e.g., Peter Cohen et al., Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 22627, 2016); Jonathan V. Hall et al., Labor Market 
Equilibration: Evidence from Uber (October 27, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 58.  Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard 
for Antitrust, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (2018), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/The-Effective-Competition-Standard-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6DX-
U6NH]. 
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concentration of power on behalf of the dominant entity.59 Instead, the 
attenuated conception of economics that has developed more recently within 
legal reasoning and jurisprudence—consumer welfare and price effects as the 
sole criterion of harm to competition—explains much of how the labor market 
and the economy generally got to where it is today. In particular, how workers 
and contractors have been prevented from accessing the profits generated by the 
economy’s leading firms through the exercise of unilateral power to dictate the 
contractual terms. Thanks to that, workers suffer from wage stagnation and a 
deterioration in job quality, including total control by the entity that is, 
economically, if not legally, their boss. 
Two further aspects of the ridesharing platform business model are worth 
pointing out here: surveillance and non-linear driver pay structures. In the 
summer of 2018, a team of company-affiliated economists released yet another 
paper pointing to Uber’s ostensibly efficiency-enhancing business model.60 The 
researchers compared the tendency of Uber drivers to shirk by taking longer-
distance routes between the same two endpoints to the tendency of New York 
City taxi drivers to do the same. The meaningful differences between the two 
groups consisted of routes taken for fares originating at LaGuardia Airport and 
terminating in Manhattan. The researchers found that Uber drivers tend to shirk 
less than do taxi drivers, which they attribute to the fact that both Uber itself and 
the customer in the back seat can monitor the driver in real time using GPS, 
whereas traditional taxi drivers retain more discretion, and apparently use it to 
increase their take-home pay at riders’ expense. But the ability to monitor 
employees in real time is part of both the statutory definition of employment and 
the economic concept of control. According to the paper, Uber’s use of 
monitoring technology to improve the service enjoyed by its customers is exactly 
the context in which we would recognize that an employment relationship exists 
and grant rights to the employee.61 Instead, Uber drivers remain subordinate to 
Uber, which sets their fares and the share they take home. Taxi drivers, on the 
other hand, are normally also independent contractors, but they are genuinely 
more independent in that they are not monitored in real time. And neither they 
nor the medallion owner (if the driver does not own his own medallion) has 
discretion to set prices. Instead, fares in the taxi market are regulated. 
Uber was also found to be operating a program nicknamed “Hell” that 
monitored whether drivers were multi-homing (i.e., logging into more than one 
ridesharing platform simultaneously to choose between competing fares) or 
single-homing and penalized the ones that were not taking customers on the Uber 
platform exclusively.62 More generally, the ridesharing companies operate bonus-
 
 59.  Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280. 
 60.  Meng Liu et al., Do Digital Platforms Reduce Moral Hazard? The Case of Ubers and Taxis, 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 25015, 2018).  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui & Julian Nowag, Buyer Power in the Big Data and Algorithm 
Driven World: The Uber & Lyft Example, COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/buyer-power-in-the-big-data-and-algorithm-driven-
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based driver pay policies with a low base rate and a bonus for achieving a certain 
acceptance rate, or service in a given geographic area.63 This system effectively 
requires sole use of a single app and following that app’s directions about where 
and when to work in order to win. While not technically requiring exclusivity on 
the part of drivers, this pay structure makes it very likely.64 And while such 
exclusive dealing (and market division, if there were to be any agreement to 
engage in similar non-linear bonus-based pay policies between Uber and Lyft) 
might be thought to implicate antitrust, those companies have seemingly faced 
no public enforcement since the Meyer v. Kalanick case was forced into 
arbitration. 
These instances of increasing control of drivers by ridesharing platforms 
correspond to the general picture of ride-sharing employment that Alex 
Rosenblat paints in her recent book Uberland.65 Rosenblat argues that the labor 
platforms are re-making the terms of employment to their own liking, exercising 
power over price-setting, quality and terms of service, and all manner of other 
relevant margins to customers and to workers, while disclaiming all 
responsibility.66 Initially, Uber and similar online labor platforms presented 
themselves as neutral market-makers matching drivers to customers, 
ameliorating the search frictions inherent in any labor market through the 
innovative application of new technology.67 Now, though, the platforms present 
their contribution to public welfare more as arising directly from their control 
over the market and its participants, rather than from their neutral facilitation of 
bilateral transactions. This hybrid business model of total control but no 
responsibility as an employer is one optimized not only to the erosion of labor 
protections, but also to the erosion of antitrust’s restrictions on vertical restraints. 
In fact, it is highly reminiscent of the arguments found in the Law and Economics 
literature validating antitrust’s increasing permissiveness toward vertical 
restraints on the grounds that the concentration and consolidation of power 
within the economy is economically efficient.68 However, there’s nothing optimal 
or efficient about it, other than the efficient use of regulatory arbitrage to 
dominate and extract rents from every other counterparty and stakeholder in the 
market without having to follow the laws that bind everyone else. 
 
world-the-uber-lyft-example/ [https://perma.cc/FHR7-KJPG]. 
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 65.  See ROSENBLAT, supra note 63. 
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 67.  See Nicholas Buchholz, Spatial Equilibrium, Search Frictions, and Dynamic Efficiency in the 
Taxi Industry (July 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Princeton University) (presenting 
Uber and similar platforms as reducing search frictions).  
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III 
ANTITRUST AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE GIG ECONOMY 
The erosion of antitrust in the direction of permitting vertical price- and non-
price restraints has effectively legalized labor outsourcing, misclassification, and 
the gig economy. This has resulted in  dominant firms having access to a wider 
range of profitable business models that exert greater power and control over 
workers than they once did. Fundamentally, this trend within antitrust is in the 
direction of increasing the power of the economy’s most powerful actors. 
The flip side of this is that antitrust law has also made it more difficult for less 
powerful actors to collectively mitigate such power inequities. Sandeep Vaheesan 
refers to Albert Hirschman to make this point: not only has antitrust made it 
harder for workers and small businesses to exit in order to exercise countervailing 
power; it has also prevented them from using voice to do so.69 All of the 
mechanisms of concentrated power described in Part II could be categorized as 
curtailing workers’ use of exit strategies to evade the control of their employers. 
This Part focuses on antitrust’s dual opposition to worker voice. 
Between the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act in 1932, the federal antitrust enforcers used the former to curtail the 
collective bargaining activities of militant (and effective) labor organizing. In 
1892, the Supreme Court ruled that the Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of 
New Orleans was illegal coordination by labor groups in violation of the Sherman 
Act’s ban on restraints of trade.70  In 1894, the Cleveland Administration accused 
Eugene V. Debs, the head of the American Railway Union, of entering into 
criminal restraints of trade for organizing the Pullman Strike, including a 
nationwide boycott of trains carrying Pullman Cars. In fact, as the Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled on the case, the Sherman Act proved to be unnecessary: the 
Court held that the government could obtain an injunction against the strike and 
imprisonment of Debs without any statutory authorization, as it amounted to an 
exercise of its legitimate law enforcement powers to crush civil unrest.71  
Likewise, in the 1908 case Loewe v. Lawlor, a company that had been 
targeted by a nationwide boycott on the part of the American Federation of 
Labor successfully sued the union trying to obtain recognition as its workers’ 
bargaining agent under the Sherman Act.72 The Supreme Court agreed that such 
a boycott was an illegal restraint of trade and forced the union and its members 
to pay treble damages to their employer.73 These three cases show that the 
antitrust laws were a potent weapon in the hands of employers seeking to prevent 
unionization. During the same period, the government struggled half-heartedly 
to find a way to use the Sherman Act to limit corporate power, but it moved 
 
 69.  Sandeep Vaheesan, Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two Gilded 
Ages, Md. L. Rev.  (forthcoming). 
 70.  United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 U.S. 994 (1892). 
 71.  In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1985).  
 72.  Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).  
 73.  Id.  
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decisively, with the full cooperation of the judiciary, to use it to curtail labor 
power.74 
The Clayton Act of 1914 included an exemption for labor from the antitrust 
laws,75 but courts interpreted it narrowly such that secondary boycotts were still 
illegal.76 It was not until the Norris-LaGuardia Act that unions were entirely 
immunized from antitrust liability. But in the jurisprudence of the so-called labor 
exemption that developed in the decade or so thereafter, antitrust immunity 
came to be connected to statutory employment status, like the right to collectively 
bargain itself.77 Therefore, in the current era of the erosion of statutory 
employment, we also have the erosion of the antitrust labor exemption. 
The Federal Trade Commission has undertaken a long-running campaign 
against collective action by associations of professionals who seek to constrain 
entry, and in some cases, to forbid their members from soliciting business away 
from fellow members and to set minimum prices for their services. The 
commission has brought such cases against doctors, church organists, ice-skating 
instructors, music teachers, and public defenders.78 This enforcement line has 
accompanied a push by the agency to reduce state action, meaning the regulatory 
authority of states or municipalities to displace competition in favor of some 
other legitimate policy goal, notwithstanding prohibitions in federal law. For 
example, municipal taxi regulatory regimes, which limit the total number of taxis 
on the road, impede entry into the taxi business. However, this impediment has 
the legitimate purpose of preventing market saturation, thereby ensuring that 
driving a taxi is a viable full-time job. It also hopefully ensures that coverage is 
universal in both time and space and that a customer unfamiliar with the city can 
obtain a licensed and qualified professional rather than an unsafe or just 
unqualified service provider. Some of the FTC’s campaign against restrictions on 
competition in the market for service professionals consisted of attacks on 
licensing regimes that effectively protect incumbents and limit competition. The 
FTC’s “economic liberty task force” is devoted to this, as was the case the FTC 
litigated to the Supreme Court in 2015 and won: North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners.79 The ruling held that a state board consisting primarily of members 
of the profession being regulated could not benefit from the state action 
exemption.80 
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Even before the recent campaign against the state action exemption, the FTC 
involved itself in efforts by independent contractors to organize themselves in 
response to the trucking deregulation that de-unionized the sector in the late 
1970s. Port truckers aspired to bargain collectively against logistics companies 
that were coordinating trucking services on behalf of powerful wholesalers and 
retailers and subjected them to low pay, long hours, and thus high turnover. The 
FTC as well as quasi-public entities like port authorities intervened on behalf of 
those companies and accused the truckers of violating the Sherman Act during 
organizing drives in the late 1990s and 2000s.81 This stance is consonant with the 
rationale behind trucking and transportation deregulation in the first place: that 
inefficient suppliers, middlemen, and stakeholders were preventing efficiencies 
attending to unitary control from being realized in regulated industries. 
Therefore, competition in the deregulation era would drive down the rents being 
earned by those insiders. Permitting truckers to bargain collectively as 
contractors once they had been de-unionized would have sacrificed all those 
supposed gains. The FTC also dissuaded Ohio from passing a state law that would 
have allowed independent contractor home health aides to bargain collectively 
with staffing companies and their clients in 2008.82 
The logic for these types of enforcement decisions can be found in the 
consumer welfare standard, just as was the case for vertical restraints imposed by 
dominant firms: protecting consumers is all that matters, and consumers are 
protected best when the most efficient firms have sufficient power and discretion 
to control the market, including at multiple levels of the supply chain, without 
having to reckon with any other stakeholder. On this reasoning, collective action 
by port truckers, home health aides, church organists, or gig economy workers is 
inefficient rent-seeking, and antitrust action against it “protects competition, not 
competitors.” The superior efficiency to be found in, for example, Uber having 
the power to surveil, direct, and fix prices for its drivers, despite their 
independent contractor status, would be threatened if drivers had the power to 
mediate that surveillance or price-setting through any kind of co-determination. 
It is against this background of hostility to state and local regulation and 
collective bargaining that the FTC and the Department of Justice intervened in 
another antitrust case involving Uber. After the lawsuits alleging employment 
misclassification against Uber had been sent to arbitration, the Seattle City 
Council passed an ordinance granting collective bargaining rights to ridesharing 
drivers who are not employees.83 The Chamber of Commerce, acting on behalf 
of Uber, filed an antitrust claim against the city for facilitating a violation of the 
Sherman Act: collective bargaining over wages and working conditions by non-
employee drivers.84 After the federal district court sided with the city that its 
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ordinance was covered by the state action exemption,85 the federal antitrust 
agencies filed an amicus brief in circuit court alleging that the state action 
exemption was limited to the customer-facing side of the taxi market and thus 
did not cover anti-competitive regulation of ride-sharing drivers.86 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals  overturned the district court,87 setting up an antitrust 
trial about whether the ridesharing collective bargaining ordinance was, in fact, 
anti-competitive. The federal agencies further suggested in their brief that if not 
covered by the state action exemption, driver collective bargaining is a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act, a naked restraint with no possible pro-competitive 
justification.88 
Rather than fight the case on the merits, Seattle modified the ordinance to 
remove collective bargaining over wages, in the hope of at least salvaging some 
version of collective bargaining without running afoul of antitrust laws.89 But the 
Chamber has apparently not been satisfied by that significant concession; in 
renewed filings, it demanded that the ordinance be wholly abandoned, because 
naming an exclusive bargaining agent for ridesharing drivers amounts to an 
illegal group boycott against any driver who does not wish to be represented 
collectively.90 
At this point, it is clear that the federal agencies are fully behind the use of 
antitrust laws to undermine worker bargaining power, just as much as they are 
behind the non-use of the antitrust laws against employer power and control in 
the fissured workplace. As Sanjukta Paul has pointed out, if the church organist 
professional organization had, instead of publishing guidelines preventing its 
members from underbidding one another for gigs, programmed an app to match 
organists to churches seeking their services, and prevented their members from 
performing at a church matched to another member via the app, the antitrust 
authorities would have been just as solicitous of the organists’ app as they have 
been of Uber’s price-fixing and market-division business model—provided the 
organists’ app had been operated in the interest of a “for-profit hiring hall” like 
Uber, as opposed to in the interest of the organists themselves.91 That 
jurisprudence and disposition of enforcement resources effectively means that 
Uber drivers or organists as workers are paying a significant price to the unitary 
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platforms coordinating the labor market in which those workers sell their services 
for the privilege of restraining trade and avoiding a free-for-all.92 Should any 
antitrust case against Uber for price-fixing, exclusion, or market division ever see 
the light of day after Meyer v. Kalanick, it’s likely that the agencies would take 
the view that its restraints are vertical and hence subject to the Rule of Reason 
(as the DOJ has argued  in the litigation over no-poaching clauses in franchising 
contracts93), rather than per se illegal like non-employee driver collective 
bargaining. As Sandeep Vaheesan has phrased it, antitrust is about 
“accommodating capital and policing labor.”94 
IV 
CONCLUSION: USING ANTITRUST TO RE-BALANCE POWER IN LABOR 
MARKETS 
This paper sets out an important but under-appreciated aspect of the rise in 
labor market precarity and diminishing worker bargaining power: the erosion of 
antitrust laws restricting dominant firms’ ability to use vertical restraints to 
control and restrict both less powerful affiliates and the workers who work for 
them, and the concurrent use of antitrust against any attempt by those workers 
or independent businessmen or contractors to bargain collectively against such 
concentrations of power. In ascertaining the causes of contemporary inequality 
in wealth, income, and social status, especially with respect to the labor market, 
we cannot overlook the role that antitrust has played. 
This contrasts with a recent Economic Policy Institute paper by Heidi 
Shierholz and Josh Bivens that treats the rise of employer power in labor 
markets, and the extent to which weakening antitrust has caused that 
phenomenon, as a less important cause of rising inequality and stagnant wages 
compared to the erosion of labor law and thus of collective bargaining.95 Their 
evidence for the contention that diminishing worker bargaining power matters 
more than concentrated employer bargaining power is that inequality within the 
distribution of labor income is a more significant cause of stagnating wages and 
the growing gap between median worker pay and average worker productivity 
than is the declining labor share of national income, which is of more recent 
vintage than either of the first two economic trends. 
But we cannot map rising labor income inequality to worker bargaining 
power and labor law and the declining labor share of income to employer power 
and antitrust so neatly. As the analysis in Parts II and III show, income inequality 
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is to a large extent caused by rising earnings inequality between firms, rather than 
between workers, reflecting employer power to set wages. This is the result of the 
legalization of business models like the fissured workplace that allow powerful 
employers to segregate workers from the profits they earn for their bosses. The 
point of Part II of this paper is that the fissured workplace is the product of both 
labor regulation and antitrust. Thus, increasing inequality of power between 
employers and workers cannot be coherently treated as two separate 
phenomena: rising employer power, and declining worker power. 
That means the solution to unequal bargaining power is not necessarily or not 
entirely an antitrust solution, but antitrust must play a major part, since it 
implicates the business models available to the economy’s dominant firms. In 
particular, we should seek, through revived antitrust and labor regulations that 
both take account of how the economy actually works, and how power is 
exercised within it, to re-establish the sharp distinction embodied in Richfield Oil. 
Either workers are employees, in which case they can be controlled by their 
bosses, who in turn owe them statutory protections including the right to bargain 
collectively, or they are independent businesses, in which case they cannot be 
coerced by contract or by any other means. Proposals to extend and strengthen 
labor law tests for statutory employment to take account of gig economy 
technologies are crucial, but they will be ineffective so long as employers and lead 
firms retain the strong incentive to push workers outside their protection. The 
role of antitrust in that context is to create a significant cost to so doing: the 
potential for treble damages under antitrust liability should a lead firm be caught 
coordinating and directing the activities of its non-employee subsidiaries and 
contractors. That is the mechanism that would weigh against employers’ 
incentive to mis-classify. 
Putting such an antitrust regime in place entails the abandonment of both the 
consumer welfare standard and, with it, the Chicago School’s jurisprudence of 
vertical restraints. Instead, any vertical restraint, price or non-price, should be a 
presumptive violation of the Sherman Act if it is imposed by a firm with market 
power. And antitrust’s definition of market power must, in turn, be expanded 
beyond the confined market-share-based Sherman Act jurisprudence to instead 
take account of the many ways economists have of testing for the existence of 
market power. Firms would be judged to have market power if they: 
• Have the power to unilaterally raise prices for their customers or 
lower them for their suppliers, including workers; 
• Wage- or price-discriminate among customers, suppliers, or workers; 
• Unilaterally impose non-price, uncompensated contractual provisions 
on their counterparties, like non-compete agreements in labor 
contracts; 
• Impede or control entry by would-be competitors; or 
• Earn profits and/or make payments to their shareholders at a rate in 
excess of their market cost of capital. 
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All of these things are economic indicia of market power because they could 
not be done by any one or more firms acting in concert in the face of competition 
from rivals—therefore they should be legal indicia of market power as well.96 
Drilling down on how the antitrust laws should target labor market 
monopsony in particular, not merely prohibit vertical restraints that enable 
fissured workplace-style business models, the antitrust authorities should bring a 
monopsonization suit against an online labor platform like Uber that fixes wages 
and imposes exclusivity on independent businesses, along the lines of Meyer v. 
Kalanick. If, as would be expected, that case would be adjudicated under the Rule 
of Reason, despite its economic equivalence to the FTC’s per se cases against 
professional organizations and unions of independent contractors, then Congress 
should streamline the Rule of Reason for labor monopsony. This should be done 
along the lines proposed by Ioana Marinescu and Eric Posner, setting out 
principles to guide market definition that are responsive to measured firm-level 
labor supply elasticities.97 In fact, if firms have the unilateral power to dictate 
wages without causing a significant share of their workforce to leave, then the 
proper market definition for a monopsonization case may be significantly smaller 
than the one those authors recommend as a baseline. The point of such a suit is 
to force Uber to choose one business model or another: either employ the drivers 
if Uber wants to fix their wages and monitor them on the job, or give up the price-
setting and market coordination power that makes the platform such a value 
proposition for its investors. It cannot be allowed to do both. Meanwhile, workers 
themselves who are not statutory employees should be protected by antitrust’s 
labor exemption and should be permitted to bargain collectively. However, any 
such extension of the labor exemption must not also immunize the powerful 
employer against whom they would seek to bargain. And at the very least, both 
no-poaching clauses in franchising contracts and non-compete clauses in 
employment contracts should be illegal per se.98 
Finally, analysis of labor market impact should be incorporated in the 
statutory prospective merger review process that federal agencies undertake as a 
matter of routine, in order to prevent the harmful accumulation of monopsony 
power in labor markets by merger. The current FTC Chairman, Joseph Simons, 
said as much in Congressional testimony in the fall of 2018,99 but to date there is 
no evidence that any such investigation has taken place. In the recent merger 
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approval for Staples’s takeover of its supplier Essendant, the majority of the 
commission claimed that the merger would have a pro-competitive impact on 
input markets.100 Specifically, if the combined firm reduced the price it pays to 
manufacturer, it would in fact purchase more from them, not less, and hence that 
price reduction would not be an exercise of buyer power (the majority’s opinion 
says nothing about labor specifically as an input). But the idea that the volume of 
sales is dispositive about the anti-competitive exercise of monopsony power is 
not correct. Wilmers  finds evidence that dominant retailers and manufacturers 
impose price reductions on the suppliers over whom they exercise market power, 
and those suppliers in turn pass those price reductions through to their workers 
in the form of lower wages.101 That is an exercise of monopsony power, but it 
might well be accompanied by greater sales volume from the supplier to the 
dominant customer. 
Altogether, the thesis of this paper is that there is no way to confront the 
economy’s crisis of unequal bargaining power without confronting the role that 
antitrust has played in getting us there. Antitrust is not a substitute to any of the 
many other ways that policy ought to be extended to halt and reverse the 
economy-wide erosion of worker bargaining power behind rising inequality and 
wage stagnation. But strengthening it is a necessary condition for the success of 
many of those alternatives, notably, labor law reform and collective bargaining 
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